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Even within a reasonable "time perspective," it is never easy to write a 
balanced account of a revolutionary upheaval in any society, let alone in 
one that as a result of that very event found itself in a decades-long 
oppressive atmosphere, just now beginning to approach its eventual 
dispersal. 
Boris Mlakar, a historian with Slovenia's Institute for 
Contemporary History, has overcome a number of clear and subtle 
obstacles in this area. By deciding to sweep aside the historical and 
ideological debris covering the issue of Slovene "anti-communist" 
activity during the Second World War, he presents a comprehensive 
picture of Slovensko Domobranstvo to coming generations of Slovenes. 
Slovensko Domobranstvo, or the Slovene Home Defense, was the name 
given to a military organization that came to life in occupied Slovenia 
after the collapse of Mussolini's Italy in September 1943, during the 
Second World War. 
After the fall of Royal Yugoslavia in April 1941, the communists 
(until that time a minority) did not demonstrate any undue apprehen-
sion. After all, Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany were still very much 
allied at that particular moment. However, things changed on 22 June 
1941 when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. The communists were quick 
to follow Stalin's urgent appeal (in his speech on 1 July 1941) and 
launched a "national liberation struggle," although it was really a 
camouflaged social revolution along the lines of the 1917 Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia. Revolution, of course, means violence and plenty of 
it and, sooner or later, a counterrevolution and counter-violence - and 
plenty of it. Because all of this developed against the backdrop of the 
Second World War, the complexity of the situation, described by Mlakar, 
• 
becomes evident if not understandable at the same time. 
Mlakar tries to unravel this bloody enigma. The communists 
pursued two goals: to make the anticommunists ever more dependent on 
the occupiers, and consequently to reinforce ever more their own claim 
on postwar supremacy in the territory of Yugoslavia. The Allies, of 
course, did not take long to see through this game. However, as Churchill 
is said to have remarked , "I shall not live in Yugoslavia after the war," 
and the Allies let it be, thus implicitly permitting a well defined localized 
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problem to be treated as part of the overall war situation, although it had 
no real connection with iLl 
Maintaining an armed group Siovensko Domobranstvo under 
such circumstances, of course, demanded a refined and skillful 
leadership. Despite its "localized" character, it was no secret to anyone 
that, in the context of world conflict, the sympathies of the group by and 
large lay with the Allies. The Germans realized this as quickly as the 
communists, and they demanded and received an oath of loyalty from 
Siovensko Domobranstvo. Politically, this turned out to be the "kiss of 
death" and was a definitive signal of the impending communist victory. 
Mlakar deals with this chapter with remarkable sensibility, 
refraining from harsh judgment, let alone outright, venomous 
condemnation of the oath. Yet his analysis of the situation leads the 
reader to quiet agreement with his logic: Siovensko Domobranstvo was 
doomed. The Allies would not recognize its "local" character. 
Churchill's callousness opened the door to its final tragedy: the 
group left Slovenia at the end of hostilities, seeking asylum with the 
British troops in southern Austria. In circumstances still not fully brought 
to light, they were returned to Yugoslavia under a ruse and literally 
massacred to the last man some ten thousand of them. 
More than thilty years later, on 20 February 1978, writing about 
the "just discovered" mattt;r of forcible repatriations after the war, in an 
editorial titled "On Britain's Conscience" The Times of London wrote: 
The whole episode is not just a bit of tragic history best 
forgotten. The facts have only recently become generally 
available. They are a matter of public concern because they 
involve the public policies of this country and the way these 
policies were arrived at and implemented. 
In his treatise (which is an expanded version of his dissertation), 
Mlakar tries to bring these facts to the fore, while implicitly absolving the 
anticommunists of the most critical charge against them: national 
treason. Their "collaboration," while open, was very specific: it was not 
that they offered their help to the Germans in their fight against the West, 
but that they pleaded with the Germans for help in their own, local, 
I Cf. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (Alexandria: Time- Life, 1964, 
412-13). 
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Slovene conflict: one that had no bearing on events in the rest of the 
world, because they never fought outside their immediate territory, nor 
against any Western ally. 
The argument may not be fully persuasive, but Mlakar 
nevertheless offers enough clues and theories to start the reader on the 
way to exploring countless explanations, arguments, pleas, accusations, 
and statements. His main virtue, however, is his calm narrative: his 
"antiheroes" are not blood-spitting criminals, forcing themselves on 
hapless Slovenes. They are simple peasants protecting their families 
against a foreign, alien philosophy. Their actions, misguided though they 
may have appeared even in Mlakar's own judgment, were not malicious 
maneuvers, but open, if desperate, decisions in a desperate time. Mlakar 
manages to analyze their motives, their methods, and their expectations, 
and he tells it all at a level that will allow a compassionate, realistic, 
professional, and balanced debate to begin taking place, leading to a final 
verdict. 
The communists , on the other hand, insist to this day on the 
idea of a "national liberation war," denying that a social revolution ever 
took place in Yugoslavia (and Slovenia). A short glimpse at the 
statistics which show that their "national liberation war" killed four 
Slovenes for every single member of the occupying forces tells another 
story. 
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This is a revised version of Michael Reichmayr's 2003 University of 
Vienna dissertation, based in part on his research on the posthumous 
works of Josef Mati written between 1939 and 1947. These works focus 
